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Abstract. Internet voting will probably be one of the most significant
achievements of the future information society. It will have an enormous
impact on the election process making it fast, reliable and inexpensive.
Nonetheless, so far remote voting is considered to be very difficult, as
one has to take into account susceptibility of the voter’s PC to various
cyber-attacks. As a result, most the research effort is put into devel-
oping protocols and machines for poll-site electronic voting. Although
these solutions yield promising results, they cannot be directly adopted
to Internet voting because of secure platform problem. However, the
cryptographic components they utilize may be very useful. This paper
presents a scheme based on combination of mixnets and homomorphic
encryption borrowed from robust poll-site voting, along with techniques
recommended for remote voting – code sheets and test ballots. The pro-
tocol tries to minimize the trust put in voter’s PC by making the voter
responsible for manual encryption of his vote. To achieve this, the voter
obtains a paper ballot that allows him to scramble the vote by performing
simple operations (lookup in a table). Creation of paper ballots, as well
as decryption of votes, is performed by a group of cooperating trusted
servers. As a result, the scheme is characterized by strong asymmetry
– all computations are carried out on the server side. In consequence it
does not require any additional hardware on the voter’s side, and offers
distributed trust, receipt-freeness and verifiability.
1 Introduction
If we take a critical look on the traditional voting methods that we have been
using for years, we can observe many opportunities for fraud along with the
inability of the citizens to verify the election results. This gives a strong motiva-
tion for computer scientists to design electronic mechanisms that could realize
voting, and that would not only disable cheating and allow checking, but also
lower the costs and increase availability. Unfortunately, such electronic solutions,
contrary to traditional voting, have to face an inherent threat that any security
hole may allow massive abuse (this is an exemplification of a general phenom-
ena well described by Schneier [1], and denoted as class break). More formally
electronic voting should meet the following requirements.
– Anonymity, privacy – voters’ choice should remain their secret.
– Receipt-freeness – voter should be unable to convince a third party of the
vote decision and, as a consequence, should be unable to sell his or her vote.
ar
X
iv
:0
80
4.
23
49
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
5 A
pr
 20
08
This property is also achieved if the voter has effective measures of deceiving
a potential buyer.
– Verifiability – voter should be able to check correctness of every stage of the
protocol. He or she should be empowered to verify the tallying process (global
verifiability) and check if his or her vote was included (individual verifiabil-
ity). Usually individual verifiability requires a lookup in a public catalog,
whereas, global verifiability demands performing some computations. This
implies the fact that an average voter delegates global verifiability to experts
or watchdog organizations.
Three approaches to the problem of electronic voting have been proposed so
far [2] [3].
– Poll-site voting also denoted as DRE (Direct Recording by Electronics)
– special voting machines with dedicated software are installed in voting
booths at polling stations. Voters can cast votes by interacting with such a
machine, and in some cases he or she can receive a receipt for verification.
The terminal and the environment can be controlled. Moreover, some steps
of the protocol may by performed by an election official, for instance the
voter can be personally authorized.
– Kiosk voting – voting takes place through publicly available terminals (e.g.
sophisticated ATMs or dedicated state-owned machines). In this scenario
only the terminal can be controlled.
– Voting via Internet performed by a client-server application, run by voter’s
PC/mobile phone/PDA/smart card, and on the server side, by trusted au-
thority or authorities. Neither the terminal not the environment can be con-
trolled.
Poll-site voting. Recently, the effort of researchers is mostly put into developing
protocols and machines for poll-site voting. Among the listed approaches, this
is the least demanding from the security perspective, as we can assume control
of the voter, and on the environment (the officials are present at the poll-site).
Several well designed solutions have been proposed so far, including: [4] [5] [6] [7].
The machines used at polling stations produce encrypted ballots. The verification
of the encryption process takes place through printing two ballots and letting
the voter choose which to check. The chosen ballot is compromised by providing
(usually printing) additional data which allows verification. The process requires
a computer program and equipment (e.g. scanner). In practice, the verification
is meant to be carried out by watchdog organizations that collect the ballots
at polling stations or somewhere else. As a consequence, the remaining ballot is
believed to be properly constructed and is used to cast a vote. The ballot without
additional data cannot serve as an evidence for vote selling purposes (receipt-
freeness). Encrypted votes are published and processed by election authorities
to obtain the final result. Every voter can check if his or her encrypted vote
participated. Correctness of the processing can be universally verified. Interactive
testing of machine encryption plus verification of the processing give strong
assurance that cheating is impossible. Although verifiability and receipt-freeness
were successfully adopted to poll-site voting, they cannot be easily applied to
Internet voting by employing the same techniques (interactive testing). This is
the consequence of the following observations.
– We cannot replace dedicated machines with voters’ personal computers. This
is caused by the fact that a PC is not tamper-proof, and may leak secret infor-
mation to the voter, enabling vote selling. For instance, interactive checking
of ballots relies on the assumption that the voter does not learn verification
data for the proper ballot.
– It is difficult and expensive to reduce the size of voting machines used in
poll-site voting to make them portable (integrated printer and other imple-
mentation aspects).
– Verification of ballots requires either a trusted testing device or a third party
organization.
Remote voting. The remote voting approach is the most convenient and cost-
effective. It also reflects the needs of the modern society. Nonetheless, it is con-
siderably more challenging, as we have to take into account various cyber-attacks
(possibly launched from a hostile country), and less control of the voter [8] [3].
Vulnerabilities of voter’s PC may open the door to many serious abuses, e.g.
automated vote selling or malicious changing of votes. Several countermeasures
have been proposed to minimize the trust put in voter PC. Apart from the ex-
pensive ones (trusted hardware) and the idealistic ones (clean operating system)
code sheets, and test ballots seem to be promising [3]. Code sheets impose a
complete asymmetry in the computational sense – no computations are done on
the voter’s side. This is achieved by providing voters with ballots that contain
unique codes representing candidates (different set of codes for each ballot). Each
candidate code has a verification code assigned to it. The PC is used to pass the
entered code on to the election authority, which returns the relevant verifica-
tion code. The response is displayed by the PC, integrity of remotely cast vote.
Honest election authority may prevent cyber-attacks, but a dishonest one can
try to influence elections results or breach voter’s privacy. An exemplification
of code sheets scheme is SureVote system [9]. Test ballots is an approach that
suggests introducing special ballots in the voting stage. The ballots should be
unrecognizable for the tallying authorities, so that they are unable to predict for
which ballots they will have to reveal processing after publication of the result.
In addition to the SureVote system, there are attempts to solve the untrusted
platform problem by utilizing trusted hardware ([10]), but these solutions have
to face a serious threat of malicious producers and kleptography [11].
2 Sketch of the new protocol
2.1 Design goals
Design of the presented protocol was motivated by four main aims.
– Providing verification and receipt-freeness at the same time.
– Easy and inexpensive integration with traditional elections. It means that
no additional hardware on the client side is required and that remote voters
may be recognized before traditional elections start to prevent double voting.
– Reduction of trust put in voter’s PC and software it runs, by assuring that
voter’s computer is unable to record and change choices made by its user
(neither randomly nor intentionally).
– Distribution of trust put in authorities.
The main idea of the protocol is that the voter encrypts his vote manually
by performing simple operations on his paper ballot. This assumption creates a
need for a scrambling method that is feasible to perform on a piece of paper.
Permutations, or cyclic rotations in particular, lend themselves naturally to this
goal. Operations performed by the voter can be inverted by a group of coop-
erating servers that perform distributed computations. This is how the trust is
distributed, and contrary to code sheets, the process of decrypting votes can be
publicly controlled. This model also includes distributed creation of paper bal-
lots. The ballot can be interactively tested using similar techniques as in poll-site
machines.
2.2 Actors
Apart from the voters, the protocol employs the following trusted authorities.
– EC1 (Election Committee 1 ) - provides an on-line voting service, whose
users are authorized using known protection mechanisms. Communication
with EC1 can be established through an authenticated (in both directions),
private channel.
– EC2 (Election Committee 2 ) - prints paper ballots used to encrypt user
choice.
– A1, A3, ..., Aλ – authorities that participate in the process of creating paper
ballots, and in the process of decrypting votes, they assure also distribution
of trust and audit.
– BB – bulletin board, provides an authenticated public channel – allows to
publish and then access signed messages.
2.3 The protocol from the voter’s perspective
1. (Registration) Registration procedure should be similar to applying for an
electronic bank account. A citizen fills in an application form and submits it
personally to the local administration office where he is personally authorized
(based on his signature and ID card). After a reasonable period of time
the voter is able to receive his elections kit from EC1. The kit contains
credentials which enable remote authentication of the user. The methods
used here may be similar to the ones used in e-banking, e.g. PIN, password,
one-time passwords, token. A token integrated with electronic ID card or
signatures-enabled ID is considered to be an optimal solution.
2. (Obtaining of paper ballot) A few months before elections a citizen, who is
willing to cast his vote via Internet is obliged to visit the local administration
office in order to obtain a paper ballot, and to be personally authorized. It
is assumed that the voter has already gained access to the election service
(see: registration). The voter chooses two ballots, then decides which one
should be verified. The selected ballot is recoded by an election official, and
can be verified by the voter or by a civic committee. The other ballot is
separated from the part containing validation data, and serves as proper
means of casting a vote. The validation data is destroyed in the presence of
the voter.
3. (Manual encryption) Every ballot has a simple operation assigned to it. The
transformation is represented by a table so that it is easy for the voter to
encode his or her candidate number v by the value v+ sh mod c. The voter
marks the candidate’s number and reads the underlying encryption of the
vote.
4. (Vote submission) The voter log into the voting system, enters id and the
encrypted vote.
5. (Publication of encrypted votes) EC1 publishes voters’ names along with
encrypted votes on the BB.
6. (Verification) Voter checks if his vote reached bulletin board in an unchanged
form.
7. (Vote results publication) The votes are decrypted by trusted authorities
A1, A3, . . . , Aλ and published.
3 Building blocks
Most of the building blocks we employ are based on the ElGamal public key
cryptosystem. Let p be a large prime, g a generator in Zp and x a random
element of Zp. We define: ElGamal private-public key pair as (x; p, g, y(= gx
mod p)), ElGamal encryption function ey(m) = (myk, gk) and decryption func-
tion dx(a, b) = a/bx Owner A of asymmetric keys (x; p, g, y) can prove non-
interactively that a given cipertext (a, b) is an encryptption of message m using
a zero-knolege proof of equality of discete logs (logb(a/m) = logg(y)) [12]. We
will denote the proof as nizk(m, (a, b)).
3.1 Mix Networks
One of the most important branches in research of electronic voting are protocols
based on mix networks. Mix network protocols allow to shuffle a list of encrypted
messages in a distributed way by λ trusted parties (mix servers). Each party Ai
sequentially permutes and transforms elements on the list. The resulting list is
passed on to the next mix server via an authenticated public channel (BB).
Transformations carried out by a single server obfuscate relations between input
and output elements. Therefore, it is hard to determine the secret permutation
of a single sever, and in consequence the global permutation of the whole mixnet.
We need two functions to perform distributed shuffling:
– o(m) – creates an initial encrypted form (called onion) of m that passes
through the mix servers
– tk(c) – transforms cipher text c into c′ so that: c′ encrypts the same mes-
sage as c, and it is difficult to prove this fact without the knowledge of the
randomizing value k.
There are different types of mixnets, depending on the transformation func-
tion. We will employ partially decrypting mixnets . This type of mixnet is char-
acterized by the fact that each server partially decrypts elements on its input
list and the last server yields messages. Such a mixnet based on ElGamal can
be build by defining the o and t functions as follows [13]: ok(m) = ey1y2...yλ(m),
tk((a, b)) = (a(yi+1yi+2...yλ)k/bxi , b ·gk). Where (xi, yi) are Ai asymmetric keys.
Randomized Partial Checking A mix network protocol can be employed as
a component of electronic voting if it can be guaranteed that none of the list
elements was replaced or maliciously altered. This property called robustness is
provided by additional checking. Randomized Partial Checking is a fairly simple
and effective verifying technique which was introduced in [14]. The mix servers
are obliged to reveal a random half of their input-output relations, with the
assurance that no path of length greater than 2 can be uncovered. To achieve
this property the servers are paired, and forced to uncover complementary halves
of their transformations.
In more detail, RPC consists of the following steps:
1. (Before shuffling) The mix servers publish commitments to their permuta-
tions (pcommit(pi) = (commit(pi(1)), ..., commit(pi(n)))).
2. (After shuffling) The servers establish a fairly chosen value r = r1⊕r2⊕...⊕rλ
– each server contributes its ri using commitments, so that no party is able
to determine r. Then a value q = hash(r, content(BB)) is computed, and
qi = hash(q, i) are derived. Values qi determine transitions to be revealed
in pair i. To prove validity of a selected transition of j-th input server Ai
publishes a value validator(i, j) that may consist of decommit(Πi(j)), kij ,
where kij is the randomization value used in the j-th transformation.
3.2 Homomorphic Encryption and Re-encryption
The ElGamal scheme has the property that having two encrypted messages, one
can calculate the ciphertext of multiplication of the two messages. This can be
achieved by simply multiplying the two ciphertexts. This property is known as
(·, ·)-homomorphism. For the sake of this paper (·,+)-homomorphism is more
useful. However, this requires a small modification of the original ElGamal.
– hey(m1) = (hm1 · yk1 , gk1), he(m2) = (hm2 · yk2 , gk2)
– hey(m1) · hey(m2) = (hm1 · yk1 · hm2 · yk2 , gk1 · gk2) = (hm1+m2 · yk, gk) =
hey(m1 +m2)
hm is obtained from hey(m) by performing regular ElGamal decryption, then m
is found through exhaustive search or lookup in a precomputed table. Note, that
if we take p such that a large prime q|p − 1 and a small r|p − 1 then assuming
that ord(g) = q and ord(h) = r we can perform encrypted additions in Zr.
3.3 Computing Mixnet
If we combine mixnets with the idea of homomorphic encryption we obtain a
protocol for distributed computation that has the property that it obfuscates the
relations between input and output values. Computations performed by such a
network can be used to anonymously invert the adding operation (cyclic rotation)
performed by the voter. We now obtain two new o(·), t(·) functions:
– hok(m) = hey1y2...yλ(m),
– htk,l((a, b)) = (a ·hl · (yi+1yi+2...yλ)k/bxi , b ·gk), l is a value added in a given
transformation.
4 The Protocol
4.1 Setup
Notation: n – number of paper ballots, c – number of candidates; p – secure,
public prime, such that a large prime q|p− 1 and c|p− 1, g, h – generators in Zp
of order q, c respectively; (xi; p, g, yi) – Ai asymmetric keys; (xEC2 ; p, g, yEC2)
– EC2 asymmetric key. Before elections start the following steps need to be
fulfilled.
1. EC1 chooses a permutation pi0 : Zn → Zn, and publishes the commitment.
EC1 −→ BB : pcommit(pi0)
2. Each Ai:
(a) chooses a permutation pii : Zn → Zn, and a vector of small integers
(lij < c): li = (li,1, li,1, ..., li,n);
(b) publishes the commitment to its permutation and to the values lij
Ai −→ BB : pcommit(pii), commit(li).
4.2 Actions of the protocol
Creation of ballots. Creation of paper ballots involves sending n pairs of partially
decrypting onions through the mixnet. The first onion in a pair carries an iden-
tifier of the input position, while the second one uses homomorphic encryption
to accumulate the sum sh that forms the cyclic rotation printed on the paper
ballot.
c0,j = ey1y2...yλyEC2 (pi0(j)), hc0,j = (1, 1), j = 1, .., n
EC1 −→ BB : (c0,j), (hc0,j)
The pairs of onions are then being processed by the authorities Ai (ci,j =
tki,j ,li,j (hci−1,j), hci,j = htki,j ,li,j (hci−1,j)), i = 1, 2, ..., λ − 1 and passed on
to the next authority through the bulletin board. Note that the resulting iden-
tifiers and values sh remain secret to the public audience, as they are encrypted
with EC2 public key.
Distribution and checking of ballots. Each voter V personally obtains two paper
ballots. He or she chooses one for verification and learns its validation values. The
ballot identifier is scanned by an election official and marked as invalid by EC2
on the BB. The values it contains can be verified: iˆd, sˆh, cˆλ,k, hˆcλ,k (relevant
output onions), nizk(iˆd, cˆλ,k), nizk(hvˆ, hˆcλ,k) (proofs). The other ballot provides
the voter with id, sh, which are used for voting.
Casting votes. Each voter V encrypts his vote v obtaining ev = v + sh mod c.
Encrypted vote is sent along with id to EC1 through an authenticated channel.
V
auth−→ EC1 : id, ev
The election authority publishes position on the input list p = pi−10 (id), voter’s
identifier, his encrypted vote, the onion hc′0,p = hok′0,j (ev), and k
′
0,j as proof of
the correctness of the onion.
EC1 −→ BB : p, V, ev, hc′0,p, k′0,j
Recovering and counting votes. The encrypted votes that have been available
on the bulletin board enter the same mixnet, that uses the same lij values, but
instead of adding they are now subtracted by Ai (hc′pii(j) = htk′i,j ,−li,j (hc
′
i−1,j)).
The votes are made available on the BB. The onions that reach positions on the
output list marked as invalid are traced back.
4.3 Mix-and-compute verification
For verification of the two stage process of creating ballots and recovering votes
we need also a two stage validation technique. Splitting RPC directly into two
phases – revealing 1/4 of transitions twice – does not work. This is because before
the second stage of testing a malicious mix server would be able to pinpoint
transitions that cannot be tested according to the rule that in a pair of servers
no path of length two can be uncovered. Therefore, we propose a different two
stage version of RPC, in which the servers are grouped in 4-tuples consisting of
two pairs.
1. (After creation of ballots) 1/4 of transitions of each server is revealed pre-
serving paths in uncovered pairs.
2. (After recovery of votes) Within each 4-tuple one pair is selected to reveal
remaining the 1/4 of mappings in the RPC fashion. The servers in the other
pair reveal transformations independently.
Now the probability that replacement of n onions will remain unnoticed is (1/6)n.
The transitions selected to be verified are determined in a way similar to reg-
ular RPC. However, the validating values also include elements of sums – lij .
Transitions chosen to be revealed are uncovered in both stages.
5 Further Enhancements and Remarks
Receipt-freeness and verifiability. Providing verifiability and receipt-freeness (in-
ability to sell votes) is the biggest challenge in design of voting protocols. In our
protocol the voter is given two paper ballots. He or she chooses one of them
to reveal its validation values. The ballot is marked as compromised and can
be verified by a watchdog organization. As a result the voter believes that the
other ballot, whose validation values were destroyed, is also valid. But he or she
is unable to prove it to anybody else (who was not present during interactive
testing), and sell the vote. Since the process of ballot creation and recovery of
votes is controlled, the voter is assured that his vote was properly counted.
Test ballots and interactive testing. The basic protocol presented above shows
verification of mixing operations. Nonetheless, there are two steps of the proto-
col that deserve extraordinary suspiciousness – printing of ballots, and putting
encrypted votes on the input list before decryption. Printing is verified be inter-
active testing – choosing one ballot out of two for thorough investigation. The
output position (from the ballot creating mixing) is then marked as compro-
mised. An interesting idea is to utilize the compromised ballots as test ballots.
They might be introduced into the mixnet by verification organizations or voters
themselves to strengthen verification of the decryption process (and the input
list). The decrypted votes that hit compromised positions can be traced back,
and voters who decided to check could verify their test ballot. In this sense test
ballots are a real trust increasing factor.
Code sheets. The scheme would certainly benefit form an immediate assurance
that votes cast by the voters reached the authority unchanged. To achieve this
goal we can employ verification codes inserted in the identifier onion by EC1
during creation of ballots. Natural candidates for the codes are truncated digital
signatures of EC1.
Colluding authorities. The presented protocol assumes that the authorities
EC1 and EC2 are in a conflict of interest – for instance they are controlled by
the ruling and opposition party. Otherwise, they would be able to violate users
privacy and try to introduce fake votes. This is caused by the fact that one
authority (EC1) controls the input to the computing mixnet while the other
party (EC2) controls the output.
K-out-of-L voting. In the basic setting the proposed scheme offers 1-out-of-L
voting, which means that we can choose only one candidate. However, we can
easily extend it by adding multiple cyclic rotations to K-out-of-L or K-out-of-L-
ordered voting. This requires increased number of homomorphic onions processed
by the authorities.
6 Conclusions
So far, no viable solution to the problem of remote electronic voting has been
proposed. The computational model presented in this paper is a step towards
overcoming vulnerabilities of operating systems, personal computers and the
Internet. The solution also offers receipt-freeness, and full verification of every
step. Crucial parts of the verification can be carried out by an average voter while
the more complicated procedures may be delegated to experts or independent
organizations. We also showed that autonomously computing mix servers may
be a useful component of cryptographic protocols.
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